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Abstract
The Johnson-Lindenstrauss property (JLP) of random matrices has immense applications in com-
puter science ranging from compressed sensing, learning theory, numerical linear algebra, to privacy.
This paper explores the properties and applications of a distribution of random matrices. Our distri-
bution satisfies JLP with desirable properties like fast matrix-vector multiplication, bounded sparsity,
and optimal subspace embedding. We can sample a random matrix from this distribution using exactly
2n+ n log n random bits. We show that a random matrix picked from this distribution preserves differ-
ential privacy if the input private matrix satisfies certain spectral properties. This improves the run-time
of various differentially private algorithms like Blocki et al. (FOCS 2012) and Upadhyay (ASIACRYPT
13). We also show that successive applications in a specific format of a random matrix picked from our
distribution also preserve privacy, and, therefore, allows faster private low-rank approximation algorithm
of Upadhyay (arXiv 1409.5414). Since our distribution has bounded column sparsity, this also answers
an open problem stated in Blocki et al. (FOCS 2012). We also explore the application of our distribu-
tion in manifold learning, and give the first differentially private algorithm for manifold learning if the
manifold is smooth. Using the results of Baranuik et al. (Constructive Approximation: 28(3)), our result
also implies a distribution of random matrices that satisfies the Restricted-Isometry Property of optimal
order for small sparsity.
We also show that other known distributions of sparse random matrices with the JLP does not pre-
serve differential privacy, thereby answering one of the open problem posed by Blocki et al. (FOCS
2012). Extending on the work of Kane and Nelson (JACM: 61(1)), we also give a unified analysis of
some of the known Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform. We also present a self-contained simplified proof
of the known inequality on quadratic form of Gaussian variables that we use in all our proofs. This could
be of independent interest.
Keywords. Johnson-Lindenstrauss Transform, Differential Privacy, Restricted-Isometry Property.
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1 Introduction
The Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma is a very useful tool for speeding up many high dimensional problems
in computer science. Informally, it states that points in a high dimensional space can be embedded in low-
dimensional space so that all pairwise distances are preserved up to a small multiplicative factor. Formally,
Theorem 1. Let ε, δ > 0 and r = O(ε−2 log(1/δ)). A distribution D over r × n random matrix satisfies
the Johnson-Lindenstrauss property (JLP) with parameters (ε, δ) if for Φ ∼ D and any x ∈ Sn−1, where
Sn−1 is the n-dimensional unit sphere,
PrΦ∼D
[∣∣∣∣√nr ‖Φx‖22 − 1
∣∣∣∣ > ε] < δ. (1)
Matrices with JLP have found applications in various areas of computer science. For example, it has
been used in numerical linear algebra [19, 48, 50, 55], learning theory [8], quantum algorithms [20], Func-
tional analysis [41], and compressed sensing [9]. Therefore, it is not surprising that many distribution over
random matrices satisfying JLP have been proposed that improves on various algorithmic aspects, like using
binary valued random variables [1], fast matrix-vector multiplication [2, 46], bounded sparsity [22, 43], and
de-randomization [42]. These improvements extends naturally to all the above listed applications.
Recently, Blocki et al. [12] found an application of JLP in differential privacy (see, Definition 1). They
showed that multiplying a private input matrix and a random matrix with i.i.d. Gaussian variables preserves
differential privacy. Such matrices are known to satisfy JLP for all values of r. However, the matrix mul-
tiplication is very slow. Subsequently, Upadhyay [60] showed that one could use graph sparsification in
composition with the algorithm of Blocki et al. [12] to give a more efficient differentially private algorithm.
Recently, Upadhyay [61] showed that non-private algorithms to solve linear algebraic tasks over streamed
data can be made differentially private without significantly increasing the space requirement of the un-
derlying data-structures. Unfortunately, these private algorithms update the underlying data-structure much
slower than their non-private analogues [19, 43]. The efficient non-private algorithms use other distribution
with JLP that provides faster embedding. On the other hand, it is not known whether other distribution of
random matrices with JLP preserve differential privacy or not.
This situation is particularly unfortunate when we consider differential privacy in the streaming model.
In the streaming model, one usually receives an update which requires computation of Φei, where {ei}ni=1
are standard basis of Rn. Since ‖ei‖ = 1, even the naive approach takes O(r‖ei‖0) time, where ‖ · ‖0
denotes the number of non-zero entries. This is faster than the current state-of-the-art privacy preserving
techniques. For example, the most efficient private technique using low-dimension embedding uses random
matrices with every entries picked i.i.d. from a Gaussian distribution. Such matrices requires Ω(rn) time to
update the privacy preserving data-structure even if we update few entries.
One of the primary difficulties in extending the privacy proof to other distributions that satisfies JLP
is that they introduce dependencies between random variables which might leak the sensitive information!
Considering this, Blocki et al. [12] asked the question whether other known distribution of matrices with
JLP preserve differential privacy. In Section 6, we answer this question in negative by showing that known
distributions over sparse matrices like [3, 22, 43, 46, 51] fail to preserve differential privacy (see, Theorem 31
for precise statement). In the view of this negative result, we investigate a new distribution of random
matrices. We show that careful composition of random matrices of appropriate form satisfies JLP, allows
fast matrix-vector multiplication, uses almost linear random bits, and preserves differential privacy. We also
achieve a reasonable range of parameters that allows other applications like compressed sensing, numerical
linear algebra, and learning theory. We prove the following in Section 3.
Theorem (Informal). For ε, δ > 0 and r = O(ε−2 log(1/δ)) < n1/2, there exists a distribution
D over r × n matrices that uses only almost linear random bits and satisfies JLP. Moreover,
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for any vector x ∈ Rn, Φx can be computed in O (n log (min{ε−1 log4(n/δ), r})) time for
Φ ∼ D.
1.1 Contributions and Techniques
The resources considered in this paper are randomness and time. The question of investigating JLP with re-
duced number of random bits have been extensively studied in the non-private setting, most notably by Ailon
and Liberty [3] and Kane and Nelson [42]. In fact, Dasgupta et al. [22] listed derandomizing their Johnson-
Lindenstrauss transform as one of the major open problems. Given the recent applications of matrices with
JLP to guarantee privacy in the streaming setting, it is important to investigate whether random matrices that
allows fast matrix-vector multiplication preserve privacy or not. Recently, Mironov [49] showed a practical
vulnerability in using random samples over continuous support. Therefore, it is also important to investigate
if we can reduce the number of random samples in a differentially private algorithm.
A new distribution. Our distribution consists of a series of carefully chosen matrices such that all the
matrices are formed using almost linear random samples, have few non-zero entries, and allow fast matrix-
vector multiplication. Our construction has the form Φ = PΠG, where G is a block diagonal matrices,
Π is a random permutation, and P is sparse matrix formed by vectors of dimension n/r. Each non-zero
entries of P are picked i.i.d. from a sub-gaussian distribution. Every block of the matrix G has the form
WD, where D is a diagonal matrix with non-zero entries picked i.i.d. to be ±1 with probability 1/2 and
W is a Hadamard matrix. G has the property that for an input x ∈ Sn−1, y = Gx is a vector in Sn−1
with bounded coordinates. The permutation Π helps to assure that if we break y into r-equal blocks, then
every block has at least one non-zero entry with high probability. We could have used any other method
present in the literature [24]. We chose this method because it is simple to state and helps in proving both
the concentration bound and differential privacy.
PROOF TECHNIQUE. Our proof that the distribution satisfies JLP uses a proof technique from cryptography.
In a typical cryptographic proof, we are required to show that two probability ensembles E1 and E2 are
indistinguishable. To do so, we often break the proof into series of hybrids H0 = E1, · · · ,Hp = E2. We
then prove that Hi and Hi+1 are indistinguishable for 0 ≤ i ≤ p − 1. To prove our result, we perfectly
emulate the action of a random matrix, picked from our distribution, on a vector. Our emulation uses a series
of matrix-vector multiplication. We then prove that a each of these matrix-vector multiplication preserves
isometry under the conditions imposed by the matrices that have already operated on the input vector.
APPLICATIONS. In this paper, we largely focus on two applications of the Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma:
compressed sensing and differential privacy. One of the main reasons why we concentrate on these two
applications of the Johnson-Lindenstrauss is that these two applications have conflicting goals: in differen-
tial privacy, the aim is to conceal information about an individual data while in compressed sensing, one
would like to decode an encoded sparse message. To date, the only distribution that can be used in both
these applications are the one in which entries of the matrix are picked i.i.d. from a Gaussian distribution.
Unfortunately, such matrices allow very slow matrix-vector multiplication time and require a lot of random
bits.
Differential Privacy and JLP. In the recent past, differential privacy has emerged as a robust guarantee
of privacy. The definition of differential privacy requires the notion of neighbouring dataset. We assume that
datasets are represented in the form of matrices. We say two datasets represented in the form of matrices
A and A˜ are neighbouring if A− A˜ is a rank-1 matrix with Euclidean norm at most one. This notion was
also used recently for linear algebraic tasks [35, 36, 61] and for statistical queries [12, 60]. The definition of
privacy we use is given below.
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Definition 1. A randomized algorithm,M, gives (α, β)-differential privacy, if for all neighbouring matrices
A and A˜ and all subset S in the range of M, Pr[M(A) ∈ S] ≤ exp(α)Pr[M(A˜) ∈ S] + β, where the
probability is over the coin tosses ofM.
Blocki et al. [12] showed that the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform instantiated with random Gaussian
matrices preserve differential privacy for certain queries (note that, to answer all possible queries, they
require r ≥ n). Later, Upadhyay [61] approached this in a principled manner showing that random Gaussian
matrices (even if it is applied twice in a particular way) preserves differential privacy. However, the question
whether other random matrices with JLP preserve differential privacy or not remained open. In Section 6,
we show that known distributions over sparse matrices with JLP does not preserves differential privacy.
We give an example by studying the construction of Nelson et al. [51]. Their construction requires a
distribution of R × n random matrices that satisfies JLP for suboptimal value of R. Let ΦsubD be such
a matrix, where D is a diagonal matrix with non-zero entries picked i.i.d. to be ±1 with probability 1/2.
They form an r × n matrix Φ from Φsub by forming a random linear combination of the rows of Φsub,
where the coefficients of the linear combination is ±1 with probability 1/2. In example 1 below, we give a
counter-example when Φsub is a subsampled Hadamard matrix to show that it fails to preserve differential
privacy. Note that ΦsubD is known to satisfy JLP sub-optimally [18, 45]. The counter-example when Φsub
are partial circulant matrices follows the same idea using the observation that a circulant matrix formed by
a vector g has the form F−1n Diag(Fng)Fn, where Fn is an n× n discrete Fourier transform.
Example 1. Let Φsub be a matrix formed by independently sampling R rows of a Hadamard matrix. Let
ΦD be the matrix with JLP as guaranteed by Nelson et al. [51] formed by random linear combination of the
rows of Φsub. We give two n × n matrices A and A˜ such that their output distributions ΦDA and ΦDA˜
are easily distinguishable. Let v =
(
1 0 · · · 0)T, then
A =

w 1 0 · · · 0
0 w 0 · · · 0
0 0 w · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 · · · w
 and A˜ =

w 1 0 · · · 0
1 w 0 · · · 0
0 0 w · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 · · · w

for w > 0 and identity matrix I. It is easy to verify that A and A˜ are neighbouring. Now, if we concentrate
on all possible left-most top-most 2 × 2 sub-matrices formed by multiplying Φ, simple matrix multiplica-
tions shows that with probability 1/ poly(n), the output distributions when A and A˜ are used are easily
distinguishable. This violates differential privacy. We defer the details of this calculation to Section 6.1.
Note that for large enough w, known results [12, 61] shows that using a random Gaussian matrix instead of
ΦD preserves privacy.
Example 1 along with the examples in Section 6 raises the following question: Is there a distribution over
sparse matrices which has optimal-JLP, allows fast matrix-vector multiplication, and preserves differential
privacy? We answer this question affirmatively in Section 4. Informally,
Theorem (Informal). If the singular values of anm×n input matrix A are at least ln(4/β)√16r log(2/β)/α,
then there is a distributionD over random matrices such that ΦAT for Φ ∼ D preserves (α, β+
negl(n))-differential privacy. Moreover, the running time to compute ΦAT is O(mn log r).
PROOF TECHNIQUE. To prove this theorem, we reduce it to the proof of Blocki et al. [12] as done by
Upadhyay [60]. However, there are subtle reasons why the same proof does not apply here. One of the
reasons is that one of the sparse random matrix has many entries picked deterministically to be zero. This
allows an attack if we try to emulate the proof of [12]. Therefore, we need to study the matrix-variate
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Method Cut-queries Covariance-Queries Run-time # Random Samples
Exponential Mechanism [14, 47] O(n log n/α) O(n log n/α) Intractable n2
Randomized Response [32] O(
√
n|S| log |Q|/α) O˜(√d log |Q|/α) Θ(n2) n2
Multiplicative Weight [37] O˜(
√|E| log |Q|/α) O˜(d√n log |Q|/α) O(n2) n2
Johnson-Lindenstrauss [12] O(|S|√log |Q|/α) O(α−2 log |Q|) O(n2.38) rn
Graph Sparsification [60] O(|S|√log |Q|/α) − O(n2+o(1)) n2
This paper O(|S|√log |Q|/α) O(α−2 log |Q|) O(n2 log b) 2n+ n log n
Table 1: Comparison Between Differentially Private Mechanisms.
distribution imposed by the other matrices involved in our projection matrix. In fact, we show a simple
attack in Section 4 if one try to prove privacy using the idea of Upadhyay [60] in our setting.
COMPARISON AND PRIVATE MANIFOLD LEARNING. Our result improves the efficiency of the algorithms
of Blocki et al. [12] Upadhyay [60], and the update time of the differentially private streaming algorithms of
Upadhyay [61]. In Table 1, we compare our result with previously known bounds to answer cut-queries on
an n-vertex graph and covariance queries on an n×m matrix. In the table, S denotes the subset of vertices
for which the analyst makes the queries, Q denotes the set of queries an analyst makes, E denotes the set
of edges of the input graph, b = min{c2a log
(
r
δ
)
, r} with a = c1ε−1 log
(
1
δ
)
log2
(
r
δ
)
. The second and
third columns represents the additive error incurred in the algorithm for differential privacy. Table 1 shows
that we achieve the same error bound as in [12, 60], but with improved run-time (note that b  n) and
quadratically less random bits.
Our theorem for differential privacy is extremely flexible. In this paper, we exhibit its flexibility by
showing a way to convert a non-private algorithm for manifold learning to a private learning algorithm.
In manifold learning, we are m points x1, · · · ,xm ∈ Rn that lie on an n-dimensional manifoldM . We
have the guarantee that it can be described by f : M → Rn. The goal of the learning algorithm is to find
y1, · · · ,ym such that yi = f(xi). It is often considered non-linear analogs to principal component analysis.
We give a non-adaptive differentially private algorithm under certain smoothness condition on the manifold.
PRIVATE LOW-RANK APPROXIMATION. The above theorem speeds up all the known private algorithms
based on the Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma, except for the differentially-private low-rank approximation
(LRA) [61]. This is because the privacy proof in [61] depends crucially on the fact that two applications of
dense Gaussian random matrices in a specific form also preserves privacy. To speed up the differentially
private LRA of [61], we need to prove analogous result. In general, reusing random samples can lead to
privacy loss. Another complication is that there are fixed non-zero entries in P. In Theorem 24, we prove
that differential privacy is still preserved with our distribution.
Our bound shows a gradual decay of the run-time as the sparsity increases. Note that the bounds of [51]
is of interest only for r ≥ √n; it is sub-optimal for the regime considered by [3, 5].
Other Applications. Due to the usefulness of low-dimension embedding, there have been considerable
efforts by researchers to prove such a dimensionality reduction theorem in other normed spaces. All of these
efforts have thus far resulted in negative results which show that the JLP fails to hold true in certain non-
Hilbertian settings. More specifically, Charikar and Sahai [17] proved that there is no dimension reduction
via linear mappings in `1-norm. This was extended to the general case by Johnson and Naor [41]. They
showed that a normed space that satisfies the JL transform is very close to being Euclidean in the sense that
all its subspaces are close to being isomorphic to Hilbert space.
Recently, Allen-Zhu, Gelashvili, and Razenshteyn [6] showed that there does not exists a projection
matrix with RIP of optimal order for any `p norm other than p = 2. In the view of Krahmer and Ward [45]
and characterization by Johnson and Naor [41], our result gives an alternate reasoning for their impossibility
result. Moreover, using the result by Pisier [52], which states that, if a Banach space has Banach-Mazur
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distance o(log n), then the Banach space is super-reflexive, we get one such space using just almost linear
samples. This has many applications in Functional analysis (see [21] for details).
Other Contributions. In Section 6, we answer negatively to the question raised by Blocki et al. [12]
whether already known distributions of random matrices with JLP preserve differential privacy or not.
We show this by giving counterexamples of neighbouring datasets on which the known distributions fail
to preserve differential privacy with constant probability. Furthermore, extending on the efforts of Kane
and Nelson [42, 43] and Dasgupta and Gupta [23], in Section 7, we use Theorem 4 to give a unified and
simplified analysis of some of the known distributions of random matrices that satisfy the JLP. We also give
a simplified proof of Theorem 4 with Gaussian random variables in the full version.
1.2 Related Works
In what follows, we just state the result mentioned in the respective papers. Due to the relation between JLP
and RIP, the corresponding result also follows. The original JL transform used a distribution over random
Gaussian matrices [40]. Achlioptas [1] observed that we only need (Φi:x)2 to be concentrated around the
mean for all unit vectors, and therefore, entries picked i.i.d. to ±1 with probability 1/2 also satisfies JLP.
These two distributions are over dense random matrices with slow embedding time. From application
point of view, it is important to have fast embedding. An obvious way to improve the efficiency of the
embedding is to use distribution over sparse random matrices. The first major breakthrough in this came
through the work of Dasgupta, Kumar, and Sarlos [22], who gave a optimal distribution over random matri-
ces with only O(ε−1 log3(1/δ)) non-zero entries in every column. Subsequently, Kane and Nelson [42, 43]
improved it to Θ(ε−1 log(1/δ)) non-zero entries in every column. Ailon and Chazelle [2] took an alternative
approach. They used composition of matrices, each of which allows fast embedding. However, the amount
of randomness involved to perform the mapping was O(rn). This was improved by Ailon and Liberty [3],
who used dual binary codes to a distribution of random matrices using almost linear random samples.
The connection between RIP and JLP offers another approach to improve the embedding time. In the
large regime of r, there are known distributions that satisfies RIP optimally, but all such distributions are
over dense random matrices and permits slow multiplication. The best known construction of RIP matrices
for large r with fast matrix-vector multiplication are based on bounded orthonormal matrices or partial
circulant matrices based constructions. Both these constructions are sub-optimal by several logarithmic
factors, even through the improvements by Nelson et al. [51], who gave an ingenuous technique to bring
down this to just three factors off from optimal. The case when r  √n has been solved optimally in [3],
with the recent improvement by [4]. They showed that iterated application of WD matrices followed by
sub-sampling gives the optimal bound. However, the number of random bits they require grows linearly
with the number of iteration of WD they perform. Table ?? contains a concise description of these results.
There is a rich literature on differential privacy. The formal definition was given by Dwork et al. [27].
They used Laplacian distribution to guarantee differential privacy for bounded sensitivity query functions.
The Gaussian variant of this basic algorithm was shown to preserve differential privacy by Dwork et al. [26]
in a follow-up work. Since then, many mechanisms for preserving differential privacy have been proposed
in the literature (see, Dwork and Roth for detailed discussion [28]). All these mechanisms has one common
feature: they perturb the output before responding to queries. Blocki et al. [12, 13] and Upadhyay [60, 61]
took a complementary approach: they perturb the matrix and perform a random projection on this matrix.
Blocki et al. [12] and Upadhyay [60] used this idea to show that one can answer cut-queries on a graph,
while Upadhyay [61] showed that if the singular values of the input private matrix is high enough, then even
two successive applications of random Gaussian matrices in a specified format preserves privacy.
ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER. Section 2 covers the basic preliminaries and notations, Section 3 covers
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the new construction and its proof, Section 4 covers its applications. We prove some of the earlier known
constructions does not preserve differential privacy in Section 6. We conclude this paper in Section 8
2 Preliminaries and Notations
We denote a random matrix by Φ. We use n to denote the dimension of the unit vectors, r to denote the
dimension of the embedding subspace. We fix ε to denote the accuracy parameter and δ to denote the
confidence parameter in the JLP. We use bold faced capital letters like A for matrices, bold face small
letters to denote vectors like x,y, and calligraphic letters like D for distributions. For a matrix A, we
denote its Frobenius norm by ‖A‖F and its operator norm by ‖A‖. We denote a random vector with each
entries picked i.i.d. from a sub-gaussian distribution by g. We use e1, · · · , en to denote the standard basis
of an n-dimensional space. We use the symbol 0n to denote an n-dimensional zero vector. We use c (with
numerical subscript) to denote universal constants.
Subgaussian random variables. A random variable X has a subgaussian distribution with scale factor
λ <∞ if for all real t, Pr[etX ] ≤ eλ2t2/2. We use the following subgaussian distributions:
1. Gaussian distribution: A standard gaussian distribution X ∼ N (µ, σ) is distribution with probabil-
ity density function defined as 1√
2Πσ
exp(−|X − µ|2/2σ2).
2. Rademacher distribution: A random variableX with distribution Pr[X = −1] = Pr[X = 1] = 1/2
is called a Rademacher distribution. We denote it by Rad(1/2).
3. Bounded distribution: A more general case is bounded random variable X with the property that
|X| ≤M almost surely for some constant M . Then X is sub-gaussian.
A Hadamard matrix of order n is defined recursively as follows: Wn = 1√2
(
Wn/2 Wn/2
Wn/2 −Wn/2
)
,W1 =
1. When it is clear from the context, we drop the subscript. We call a matrix randomized Hadamard matrix
of order n if it is of the form WD, where W is a normalized Hadamard matrix and D is a diagonal matrix
with non-zero entries picked i.i.d. from Rad(1/2). We fix W and D to denote these matrices.
We will few well known concentration bounds for random subgaussian variables.
Theorem 2. (Chernoff-Hoeffding’s inequality) LetX1, · · · , Xn be n independent random variables with the
same probability distribution, each ranging over the real interval [i1, i2], and let µ denote the expected value
of each of these variables. Then, for every ε > 0, we have
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∑ni=1Xin − µ
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε] ≤ 2 exp(− 2ε2n(i2 − i1)2
)
.
The Chernoff-Hoeffding bound is useful for estimating the average value of a function defined over
a large set of values, and this is exactly where we use it. Hoeffding showed that this theorem holds for
sampling without replacement as well. However, when the sampling is done without replacement, there is
an even sharper bound by Serfling [57].
Theorem 3. (Serfling’s bound) Let X1, · · · , Xn be n sample drawn without replacement from a list of N
values, each ranging over the real interval [i1, i2], and let µ denote the expected value of each of these
variables. Then, for every ε > 0, we have
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∑ni=1Xin − µ
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε] ≤ 2 exp(− 2ε2n(1− (n− 1)/N)(i2 − i1)2
)
.
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The quantity 1− (n− 1)/N is often represented by f∗. Note that when f∗ = 0, we derive Theorem 2.
Since f∗ ≤ 1, it is easy to see that Theorem 3 achieves better bound than Theorem 2.
We also use the following result of Hanson-Wright [34] for subgaussian random variables.
Theorem 4. (Hanson-Wright’s inequality). For any symmetric matrix A, sub-gaussian random vector x
with mean 0 and variance 1,
Prg
[
|gTAg − Tr(A)| > η
]
≤ 2 exp (−min{c1η2/‖A‖2F , c2η/‖A‖}) , (2)
where ‖A‖ is the operator norm of matrix A.
The original proof of Hanson-Wright inequality is very simple when we just consider special class of
subgaussian random variables. We give the proof when g is a random Gaussian vector in Appendix C. A
proof for Rad(1/2) is also quite elementary. For a simplified proof for any subgaussian random variables,
we refer the readers to [54].
In our proof of differential privacy, we prove that each row of the published matrix preserves (α0, β0)-
differential privacy for some appropriate α0, β0, and then invoke a composition theorem proved by Dwork,
Rothblum, and Vadhan [29] to prove that the published matrix preserves (α, β)-differential privacy. The
following theorem is the composition theorem that we use.
Theorem 5. Let α, β ∈ (0, 1), and β′ > 0. IfM1, · · · ,M` are each (α, β)-differential private mechanism,
then the mechanism M(D) := (M1(D), · · · ,M`(D)) releasing the concatenation of each algorithm is
(α′, `β + β′)-differentially private for α′ <
√
2` ln(1/β′)α+ 2`α2.
3 A New Distribution over Random Matrices
In this section, we give our basic distribution of random matrices in Figure 1 that satisfies JLP. We then
perform subsequent improvements to reduce the number of random bits in Section 3.1 and improve the
run-time in Section 3.2. Our proof uses an idea from cryptography and an approach taken by Kane and
Nelson [42, 43] to use Hanson-Wright inequality. Unfortunately, we cannot just use the Hanson-Wright
inequality as done by [43] due to the way our distribution is defined. This is because most of the entries of
P are non-zero and we use a Hadamard and a permutation matrix in between the two matrices with sub-
gaussian entries. To resolve this issue, we use a trick from cryptography. We emulate the action of a random
matrix picked from our defined distribution by a series of random matrices. We show that each of these
composed random matrices satisfies the JLP under the constraints imposed by the other matrices that have
already operated on the input. The main result proved in this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 6. For any ε, δ > 0 and a positive integer n. Let r = O(ε−2 log(1/δ)), a = c1ε−1 log(1/δ) log2(r/δ),
and b = c2a log(a/δ) with r ≤ n1/2−τ for arbitrary constant τ > 0. Then there exists a distribution D of
r × n matrices over Rr×n such that any sample Φ ∼ D needs only 2n + n log n random bits and for any
x ∈ Sn−1,
PrΦ∼D
[∣∣ ‖Φx‖22 − 1∣∣ > ε] < δ. (3)
Moreover, the run-time of a matrix-vector multiplication takes O(nmin{log b, log r}) time.
We prove Theorem 6 by proving that a series of operations on x ∈ Sn−1 preserves the Euclidean norm.
For this, it is helpful to analyze the actions of every matrix involved in the distribution from which Φ is
sampled. Let y = WDx and y′ = Πy. We first look at the vector Py′.
In order to analyze the action of P on an input y′, we consider an equivalent way of looking at the
action of PΠ on y = WDx. In other words, we emulate the action of P using P1 and P2, each of
which are much easier to analyze. The row-i of the matrix P1 is formed by Φi for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. For an
input vector y′ = Πy, P2 acts as follows: for any 1 ≤ j ≤ r, P2 samples t = n/r columns entries
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Construction of Φ: Construct the matrices D and P as below.
1. D is an n× n diagonal matrix such that Dii ∼ Rad(1/2) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
2. P is constructed as follows:
(a) Pick n random sub-gaussian samples g = {g1, · · · ,gn} of mean 0 and variance 1.
(b) Divide g into blocks of n/r elements, such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, Φi =(
g(i−1)n/r+1, · · · ,gir
)
.
(c) Construct the matrix P as follows:
Φ1 0
n/r · · · 0n/r
0n/r Φ2 · · · 0n/r
...
. . . . . .
...
0n/r · · · 0n/r Φr

Compute Φ =
√
1
rPΠWD, where W is a normalized Hadamard matrix and Π is a permutation
matrix on n entries.
Figure 1: New Construction
(
y′(j−1)n/r+1, · · · ,y′jn/r
)
, multiply every entry by
√
n/t, and feeds it to the j-th row of P1. In other
words, P2 feeds z(j) =
√
n/t
(
y′(j−1)n/r+1, · · · ,y′jn/r
)
to the j-th row of P1.
‖WDx‖2 = 1 as WD is a unitary. We prove that P1 is an isometry in Lemma 9 and P2Π is an
isometry in Lemma 8. The final result (Theorem 10) is obtained by combining these two lemmata.
We need the following result proved by Ailon and Chazelle [2].
Theorem 7. Let W be a n× n Hadamard matrix and D be a diagonal signed Bernoulli matrix with Dii ∼
Rad(1/2). Then for any vector x ∈ Sn−1, we have
PrD
[
‖WDx‖∞ ≥
√
(log(n/δ)) /n
]
≤ δ.
We use Theorem 3 and Theorem 7 to prove that P2Π is an isometry for r ≤ n1/2−τ , where τ > 0 is an
arbitrary constant. Theorem 7 gives us that
√
n/t‖WDx‖∞ ≤
√
log(n/δ)/t. We use Theorem 3 because
P2Π picks t entries of y without replacement.
Lemma 8. Let P2 be a matrix as defined above. Let Π be a permutation matrix. Then for any y ∈ Sn−1
with ‖y‖∞ ≤
√
log(n/δ)/n, we have
PrΠ
[∣∣∣ ‖P2Πy‖22 − 1∣∣∣ ≥ ε] ≤ δ.
Proof. Fix 1 ≤ j ≤ r. Let y = WDx. Let y′ = Πy and z(j) =
√
n/t
(
y′(j−1)n/r+1, · · · ,y′jn/r+1
)
.
Therefore, ‖z(j)‖22 = (n/t)
∑t
i=1 y
′2
(j−1)t+i. From Theorem 7, we know that ‖z(j)‖∞ is bounded random
variable with entries at most
√
log(n/δ)/t with probability 1 − δ. Also, EP2,Π[‖z(j)‖2] = 1. Since this is
sampling without replacement; therefore, we use the Serfling bound [57]. Applying the bound gives us
PrΠ
[∣∣∣ ‖P2Πy‖22 − 1∣∣∣ ≥ ε] = Pr [|‖z(j)‖22 − 1| > ε] ≤ 2 exp(−ε2t/ log(n/δ)). (4)
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In order for equation (4) to be less than δ/r, we need to evaluate the value of t in the following equation:
ε−2t
log(n/δ)
≥ log
(
2r
δ
)
⇒ t ≥ ε2 log(n/δ) log(2r/δ).
The inequality is trivially true for t = n/r when r = O(n1/2−τ ) for an arbitrary constant τ > 0. Now
for this value of t, we have for a fixed j ∈ [t]
Pr
[|‖z(j)‖22 − 1| > ε] ≤ exp(−ε2t/ log(n/δ)) ≤ δ/r. (5)
Using union bound over all such possible set of indices gives the lemma.
In the last step, we use Theorem 4 to prove the following.
Lemma 9. Let P1 be a r × t random matrix with rows formed by Φ, · · · ,Φr as above. Then for any
z(1), · · · , z(r) ∈ St−1, we have the following:
Prg
[∣∣∣∣∣
r∑
i=1
〈Φi, z(i)〉2 − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε
]
≤ δ.
Proof. Let g be the vector corresponding to the matrix P1, i.e., gk = (P1)ij for k = (i− 1)t+ j. Let A be
the matrix formed by diagonal block matrix each of which has the form z(i)zT(i)/r for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Therefore,
Tr(A) = 1, ‖A‖2F = 1/k. Also, since the only eigen-vectors of the constructed A is
(
z(1) · · · z(r)
)T,
‖A‖ = 1. Plugging these values in the result of Theorem 4, we have
Prg
[
|gTAg − 1| > ε
]
≤ 2 exp
(
−min
{
c1ε
2
1/r
, c2ε
})
≤ δ (6)
for r = O(ε−2 log(1/δ)).
Combining Lemma 8 and 9 and rescaling ε and δ gives the following.
Theorem 10. For any ε, δ > 0 and a positive integer n. Let r = O(ε−2 log(1/δ) and D be a distribution of
r × n matrices over Rr×n defined as in Figure 1. Then a matrix Φ ∼ D can be sampled using 3n random
samples such that for any x ∈ Sn−1,
PrΦ∼D
[∣∣ ‖Φx‖22 − 1∣∣ > ε] < δ.
Moreover, the run-time of matrix-vector multiplication takes O(n log n) time.
Proof. Lemma 8 gives us a set of t-dimensional vectors z(1), · · · , z(r) such that each of them have Euclidean
norm between 1 − ε and 1 + ε. Using z(1), · · · , z(r) to form the matrix A as in the proof of Lemma 9, we
have ‖A‖2F ≤ (1 + ε)2/r and ‖A‖ ≤ (1 + ε). Therefore, using Theorem 4, we have
Prg
[
|gTAg − 1| > ε
]
≤ 2 exp
(
−min
{
c1rε
2
(1 + ε)2
,
c2ε
(1 + ε)
})
≤ δ (7)
For this to be less than δ, we need r ≤ c′(1+ε)2
ε2
log
(
2
δ
) ≤ 4c′ε−2 log(2/δ).
The above theorem has a run-time of O(n log n) and uses 2n + n log n random samples, but O(n)
random bits. We next show how to improve these parameters to achieve the bounds mentioned in Theorem 6.
3.1 Improving the number of bits
In the above construction, we use 2n+ n log n random samples. In the worse case, if g is picked i.i.d. from
Gaussian distribution, we need to sample from a continuous distribution defined over the real1. This requires
1For the application in differential privacy, we are constrained to sample from N (0, 1); however, for all the other applications,
we can use any subgaussian distribution.
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O(1) random bits for each sample and causes many numerical issues as discussed by Achlioptas [1]. We
note that Theorem 10 holds for any subgaussian random variables (the only place we need g is in Lemma 9).
That is, we can use Rad(1/2) and our bound will still hold. This observation gives us the following result.
Theorem 11. Let ε, δ > 0, n be a positive integer, τ > 0 be an arbitrary constant, and r = O(ε−2 log(1/δ))
such that r ≤ n1/2−τ , there exists a distribution of r×nmatrices overRr×n denoted byD with the following
property: a matrix Φ ∼ D can be sampled using only 2n+ n log n random bits such that for any x ∈ Sn−1,
PrΦ∼D
[∣∣ ‖Φx‖22 − 1∣∣ > ε] < δ.
Moreover, the run-time of matrix-vector multiplication takes O(n log n) time.
3.2 Improving the Sparsity Factor and Run-time
The only dense matrix used in Φ is the Hadamard matrix and results in O(n log n) time. We need it so
that we can apply Theorem 7 in the proof of Lemma 8. However, Dasgupta et al. [22] showed that a sparse
version of randomized Hadamard matrix suffices for the purpose. More, specifically, the following theorem
was shown by Dasgupta et al. [22].
Theorem 12. Let a = 16ε−1 log(1/δ) log(r/δ), b = 6a log(3a/δ). Let G ∈ Rn×n be a random block-
diagonal matrix with n/b blocks of matrices of the form WbB matrix, where B is a b × b diagonal matrix
with non-zero entries picked i.i.d. from Rad(1/2). Then we have PrG
[‖Gx‖∞ ≥ a−1/2] ≤ δ.
We can apply Theorem 12 instead of Theorem 7 in our proof of Theorem 11 as long as 1/a ≤ log(n/δ)/n.
This in turn implies that we can use this lemma in our proof as long as ε ≤ (log(1/δ) log(n/δ) log2(r/δ)) /n.
When this condition is fulfilled, G takes n/b(b log b) = n log b time to compute matrix-vector multiplica-
tion. Since P and Π takes linear time, using G instead of randomized Hadamard matrices and noting that
n/r is still permissible, we get Theorem 6. If εn ≥ log(1/δ) log(n/δ) log2(r/δ), we have to argue further.
A crucial point to note is that Theorem 12 is true for any a > 1. Using this observation, we show that the
run time is O(n log r) in this case. For the sake of completion, we present more details in the full version2.
For a sparse vector x, we can get even better run-time. Let sx be the number of non-zero entries
in a vector x. Then the running time of the block randomized Hadamard transform of Theorem 12 is
O(sxb log b+ sxb). Plugging in the value of b, we get the final running time to be
O
(
min
{
sx
ε
log
(
1
δ
)
log2
(
k
δ
)
log
(
1
δε
)
, n
}
log
(
1
δε
))
.
4 Applications in Differentially Private Algorithms
In this section, we discuss the applications of our construction in differential privacy. Since W, D, and Π
are isometry, it seems that we can use the proof of [12, 60] to prove that PAT preserves differential privacy
when P is picked using Gaussian variables N (0, 1) and A is an m × n private matrix. Unfortunately, the
following attack shows this is not true. Let P be as in Figure 1 and two neighbouring matrices A and A˜ be
as follows:
A =
(
w 0n/r−1 0n/r · · · 0n/r) and A˜ = (w 0n/r−1 1n/r/√n/r · · · 0n/r) ,
where 1n/r is all one row vector of dimension n/r. It is easy to see that PA has zero entries at positions
n/r + 1 to 2n/r, while PA˜ has non-zero entries. Thereby, it breaches the privacy. This attack shows that
we have to analyze the action of Φ on the private matrix A.
2Alternatively, we can also use the idea of Ailon and Liberty [3, Sec 5.3] and arrive at the same conclusion.
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We assume that m ≤ n. Let y = ΠWDx for a vector x. Φ is a linear map; therefore, without loss of
generality, we can assume that x is a unit vector. Let y(1), · · · ,y(r) be disjoint blocks of the vector y such
that each blocks have same number of entries. The first observation is that even if we have single non-zero
entries in y(i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r, then we can extend the proof of [12, 61] to prove differential privacy.
In Lemma 13, we show that with high probability, y(i) is not all zero vector for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Since Euclidean
norm is a metric, we prove this by proving that the Euclidean norm of each of the vectors y(i) is non-zero.
Formally,
Lemma 13. Let x ∈ Sn−1 be an arbitrary unit vector and y = ΠWDx. Let y(1), · · · ,y(r) be the r disjoint
blocks of the vector y such that y(i) = (y(i−1)t+1, · · · ,yit) for t = n/r. Then for an arbitrary 0 < θ < 1
and for all i ∈ [r],
PrΠ,D
[∥∥∥y(i)∥∥∥
2
≤ θ
]
≤ 2−Ω((1−θ)2n2/3).
Proof. Let us denote by t = n/r. From Theorem 7, we know that WDx is bounded random variable
with entries at most
√
(log(n) + n1/3)/n with probability 1 − 2−c3n/3. Let y = ΠWDx, and y(j) =√
n/t(y(j−1)t+1, · · · ,yjt)
Fix a j. First note that E[‖y(j)‖2] = 1. Since the action of Π results in sampling without replacement;
therefore, Serfling’s bound [57] gives
Pr
[∥∥∥y(j)∥∥∥2
2
≤ 1− ζ
]
≤ exp
(
− ζ
2n
log(n) + n1/3
)
≤ exp(−c′3ζ2n2/3)
for ζ < 1. Setting θ = 1− ζ and using union bound over all j gives the lemma.
Therefore, the above attack cannot be carried out in this case. However, this does not show that publish-
ing ΦAT preserves differential privacy. To prove this, we need to argue further. We use Lemma 13 to prove
the following result.
Lemma 14. Let t be as in Lemma 13. Let Π1..t denotes a permutation matrix on {1, · · · , n} restricted to
any consecutive t rows. Let W be the n × n Walsh-Hadamard matrix and D be a diagonal Rademacher
matrix. Let B =
√
N/tΦWD. Then
(1− ε)I  BTB  (1 + ε)I.
In other words, what Lemma 14 says is that the singular values of B is between (1 ± ε)1/2. This is
because all the singular values of I are 1.
Proof. We have the following:
‖BTB‖2 = max
x∈Rn
xTBTBx
〈x,x〉
= max
x∈Rn
〈Bx,Bx〉
〈x,x〉
= max
‖x‖2=1
‖Bx‖22.
From Lemma 13, with probability at least 1− δ, for all x,
1− ε ≤ max
‖x‖2=1
‖Bx‖22 ≤ 1 + ε. (8)
The lemma follows from the observation that equation (8) holds for every x ∈ Rn. In particular, if
{v1, · · · ,vk} are the first k eigen-vectors of BTB, then it holds for the subspace of Rn orthogonal to
the subspace spanned by the vectors {v1, · · · ,vk}.
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Once we have this lemma, the following is a simple corollary.
Corollary 15. Let A be an n×dmatrix such that all the singular values of A are at least σmin. Let the matrix
B be as formed in the statement of Lemma 14. Then all the singular values of BA are at least
√
1− εσmin
with probability 1− δ.
Combining Corollary 15 with the result of Upadhyay [61] yields the following result.
Theorem 16. If the singular values of an m× n input matrix A are at least ln(4/β)
√
16r log(2/β)
α(1+ε) , then ΦA
T,
where Φ is as in Figure 1 is (α, β + δ)-differentially private. It uses 2n + n log n samples and takes
O(mn log b) time, where b = min{r, c1ε−1 log(1/δ) log(r/δ) log((16ε−1 log(1/δ) log(r/δ))/δ)}.
The extra δ term in Theorem 16 is due to Corollary 15.
Proof. Let A be the private input matrix and A˜ be the neighbouring matrix. In other word, there exists
a unit vector v such that A − A˜ = E = veTi . Let UΣVT (U˜Σ˜V˜T, respectively) be the singular value
decomposition of A (A˜, respectively). Further, since the singular values of A and A˜ is at least σmin =(√
r log(2/β) log(r/β)
α(1+ε)
)
, we can write
A = U(
√
Λ2 + σ2minI)V
T and A˜ = U˜(
√
Λ˜2 + σ2minI)V˜
T
for some diagonal matrices Λ and Λ˜.
The basic idea of the proof is as follows. Recall that we analyzed the action of Φ on a unit vector x
through a series of composition of matrices. In that composition, the last matrix was P1, a random Gaussian
matrix. We know that this matrix preserves differential privacy if the input to it has certain spectral property.
Therefore, we reduce our proof to proving this; the result then follows using the proof of [12, 61].
Now consider any row j of the published matrix. It has the form
(ΦAT)j: =
(
ΦV(
√
Λ2 + σ2minI)U
T
)
j:
and (ΦA˜T)j: =
(
ΦV˜(
√
Λ˜2 + σ2minI)U˜
T
)
j:
, (9)
respectively. In what follows, we show that the distribution for the first row of the published matrix is
differentially private; the proof for the rest of the rows follows the same proof technique. Theorem 16 is
then obtained using Theorem 5. Expanding on the terms in equation (9) with i = 1, we know that the output
is distributed as per Φ1(ΠWDV)1..t(
√
Λ2 + σ2minI)U
T, where (ΠWDV)1..t represents the first t = n/r
rows of the matrix ΠWDV. Using the notation of Lemma 14, we write it as Φ1BV(
√
Λ2 + σ2minI)U
T
From Corollary 15, we know that with probability at least 1− δ, we know that the singular values of BAT
are at least
√
1− εσmin. With a slight abuse of notation, let us denote by V′(
√
Λ2 + σ2minI)U
T the singular
value decomposition of BA. We perform the same substitution to derive the singular value decomposition
of BA˜T. Let us denote it by V˜′(
√
Λ˜2 + σ2minI)U˜
T.
Since Φ1 ∼ N (0t, It×t), the probability density function corresponding to Φ1V′(
√
Λ2 + σ2minI)U
T
and Φ1V˜′(
√
Λ˜2 + σ2minI)U˜
T is as follows:
1√
(2pi)d det((V′ΣUT)UΣV′T)
exp
(
−1
2
xT
(
(V′ΣUT)UΣV′T
)−1
x
)
(10)
1√
(2pi)d det((V˜′Σ˜U˜T)U˜Σ˜V˜′T)
exp
(
−1
2
xT
(
(V˜′Σ˜U˜T)U˜Σ˜V˜′T
)−1
x
)
, (11)
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where det(·) represents the determinant of the matrix.
We first prove the following:
exp
(
− α√
4r ln(2/β)
)
≤
√
det((V˜′Σ˜U˜T)U˜Σ˜V˜′T)
det((V′ΣUT)UΣV′T)
≤ exp
(
α√
4r ln(2/β)
)
. (12)
This part follows simply as in Blocki et al. [12]. More concretely, we have det((V′ΣUT)UΣV′T) =∏
i σ
2
i , where σ1 ≥ · · · ≥ σm ≥ σmin are the singular values of A. Let σ˜1 ≥ · · · ≥ σ˜m ≥ σmin be its
singular value for A˜. Since the singular values of A− A˜ and A˜−A are the same,∑i(σi − σ˜i) ≤ 1 using
the Linskii’s theorem. Therefore,√
det((V˜′Σ˜2V˜′T)
det((V′Σ2V′T)
=
√∏
i
σ˜2i
σ2i
≤ exp
(
α
32
√
r log(2/β) log(r/β)
)∑
i
(σ˜i − σi) ≤ eα0/2.
Let β0 = β/2r. In the second stage, we prove the following:
Pr
[∣∣∣∣xT ((V′ΣUT)UΣV′T)−1 x− xT ((V˜′Σ˜U˜T)U˜Σ˜V˜′T)−1 x∣∣∣∣ ≤ α0] ≥ 1− β0. (13)
Every row of the published matrix is distributed identically; therefore, it suffices to analyze the first row.
The first row is constructed by multiplying a t-dimensional vector Φ1 that has entries picked from a normal
distribution N (0, 1). Note that E[Φ1] = 0t and COV(Φi) = I. Therefore, using the fact that UΣV′T −
U˜Σ˜V˜′T = E′ = v′eTi , where v
′ is a vector restricted to the first t columns of v.
xT
(
(V′ΣUT)UΣV′T
)−1
x− xT
(
(V˜′Σ˜U˜T)U˜Σ˜V˜′T
)−1
x
= xT
[(
(V′ΣUT)UΣV′T
)−1 − ((V˜′Σ˜U˜T)U˜Σ˜V˜′T)−1]x
= xT
[(
(V′ΣUT)UΣV′T
)−1 (
(V′ΣUT)E′ + E′TU˜Σ˜V˜′T
)(
(V˜′Σ˜U˜T)U˜Σ˜V˜′T
)−1]
x.
Also xT = Φ1V′ΣUT. This further simplifies to
= Φ1V
′ΣUT
[(
V′Σ2V′T
)−1 (
(V′ΣUT)E′ + E′TU˜Σ˜V˜′T
)(
(V˜′Σ˜2V˜′T
)−1]
UΣV′TΦT1
= Φ1
[(
V′ΣUT
)(
V′Σ2V′T
)−1
(V′ΣUT)E′
(
V˜′Σ˜2V˜′T
)−1
UΣV′T
]
ΦT1
+ Φ1
[(
V′ΣUT
)(
V′Σ2V′T
)−1
E′T
(
U˜Σ˜V˜′T
)(
V˜′Σ˜2V˜′T
)−1
UΣV′T
]
ΦT1 .
Using the fact that E′ = v′eTi for some i, we can write the above expression in the form of t1t2 + t3t4,
where
t1 = Φ1
(
V′ΣUT
)(
V′Σ2V′T
)−1
(V′ΣUT)v′,
t2 = e
T
i
(
V˜′Σ˜2V˜′T
)−1
UΣV′TΦT1 ,
t3 = Φ1
(
V′ΣUT
)(
V′Σ2V′T
)−1
ei,
t4 = v
′T
(
U˜Σ˜V˜′T
)(
V˜′Σ˜2V˜′T
)−1
UΣV′TΦT1 .
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Recall that σmin =
(√
r log(2/β) log(r/β)
α
)
, UΣV′T−U˜Σ˜V˜′T = v′eTi . Now since ‖Σ˜‖2, ‖Σ‖2 ≥ σmin,
‖v′‖ ≤ ‖v‖ ≤ 1, and that every term ti in the above expression is a linear combination of a Gaussian, i.e.,
each term is distributed as per N (0, ‖ti‖2), we have
‖t1‖ ≤ 1, ‖t2‖ ≤ 1
σmin
, ‖t3‖ ≤ 1
σmin
+
1
σ2min
, ‖t4‖ ≤ 1 + 1
σmin
.
Using the concentration bound on the Gaussian distribution, each term, t1, t2, t3, and t4, is less than
‖ti‖ ln(4/β0) with probability 1− β0/2. From the fact that 2
(
1
σmin
+ 1
σ2min
)
ln(4/β0) ≤ α0, we have equa-
tion (13).
Combining equation (12) and equation (13) with Lemma 13 gives us Theorem 16.
Theorem 16 improves the efficiency of both the algorithms of [12] (without sparsification trick [60]).
Theorem 17. One can (α, β + 2−Ω((1−θ)2n2/3))-differentially private answer both cut-queries on a graph
and directional covariance queries of a matrix in time O(n2 log r). Let Q be the set of queries such that
|Q| ≤ 2r. The total additive error incurred to answer all Q queries is O(|S|√log |Q|/α) for cut-queries
on a graph, where S is the number of vertices in the cut-set, and O(α−2 log |Q|) for directional covariance
queries.
4.1 Differentially private manifold learning
We next show how we can use Theorem 16 to differentially private manifold learning. The manifold learning
is often considered as non-linear analog of principal component analysis. It is defined as follows: given
x1, · · · ,xm ∈ Rn that lie on an k-dimensional manifoldM that can be described by f : M → Rn, find
y1, · · · ,ym such that yi = f(xi). We consider two set of sample points neighbouring if they differ by
exactly one points which are apart by Euclidean distance at most 1. Theorem 16 allows us to transform a
known algorithm (Isomap [59]) for manifold learning to a non-interactive differentially private algorithm
under a smoothness condition on the manifold. The design of our algorithm require some care to restrict the
additive error. We guarantee that the requirements of Isomap is fulfilled by our algorithm.
Theorem 18. Let M be a compact k-dimensional Riemannian manifold of Rn having condition number
κ, volume V , and geodesic covering regularity r. If n1/2−τε2 ≥ ck log(nV/κ) log(1/δ)) for an universal
constant c, then we can learn the manifold in an (ε, δ + 2−Ω((1−θ)2n2/3))-differentially private manner.
Proof. We convert the non-private algorithm of Hegde, Wakin, and Baraniuk [38] to a private algorithm for
manifold learning. We consider two set of sample points neighbouring if they differ by exactly one point
and the Euclidean distance between those two different points is at most 1. An important parameter for all
manifold learning algorithms is the intrinsic dimension of a point. Hegde et al. [38] focussed their attention
on the Grassberger and Procaccia’s algorithm for the estimation of intrinsic dimension [31]. It computes the
correlated dimension of the sampled point.
Definition 2. Let X = {x1, · · · ,xm} be a finite data points of the underlying dimension k. Then define
Cm(d) =
1
m(m− 1)
∑
i 6=j
1[‖xi − xi‖2 < r],
where 1 is the indicator function. Then the correlated dimension of X is defined as
k̂(d1, d2) :=
log(Cm(d1)/Cm(d2))
log(d1/d2)
.
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We embed the data points to a low-dimension subspace. It is important to note that if the embedding
dimension is very small, then it is highly likely that distinct point wold be mapped to same embedded point.
Therefore, we need a find the minimal embedding subspace that suffices for our purpose.
Our analysis would centre around a very popular algorithm for manifold learning known as Isomap [59].
It is a non-linear algorithm that is used to generate a mapping from a set of sampled points in a k-dimensional
manifold into a Euclidean space of dimension k. It attempts to preserve the metric structure of the manifold,
i.e., the geodesic distances between the points. The idea is to define a suitable graph which approximates the
geodesic distances and then perform classical multi-dimensional scaling to obtain a reduced k-dimensional
representation of the data.
There are two key parameters in the Isomap algorithm that we need to control: intrinsic dimension
and the residual variance which measures how well a given dataset can be embedded not a k-dimensional
Euclidean space.
Baraniuk and Wakin [10] proved the following result on the distortion suffered by pairwise geodesic
distances and Euclidean distances if we are given certain number of sample points.
Theorem 19. LetM be a compact k-dimensional manifold in Rn having volume V and condition number
κ. Let Φ be a random projection that satisfies Theorem 1 such that
r ≥ O
(
k log(nVκ) log(1/δ)
ε2
)
.
Then with probability 1− δ, for every pair of points x,y ∈M ,
(1− ε)
√
r/n‖x− y‖Geo ≤ ‖Φx−Φy‖Geo ≤ (1 + ε)
√
r/n‖x− y‖Geo,
where ‖x− y‖Geo stands for the geodesic distance between x and y.
Therefore, we know that the embedded points represents the original manifold very well. To round
things up, we need to estimate how well Isomap performs when only the embedded vectors are given. The
Isomap algorithm for manifold learning uses a preprocessing step that estimates the intrinsic dimension
of the manifold. The algorithm mentioned in Figure 1 computes an intrinsic dimension k̂ and a minimal
dimension of the embedding r before it invokes the Isomap algorithm on the embedded points. The privacy
is preserved because of our transformation of sampled points {yi} to a set of points {xi}. This is because the
matrix X formed by the set of points {xi} has its singular values greater than σmin required in Theorem 16.
So in order to show that the algorithm mentioned in Figure 2 learns the manifold, we need to show that the
intrinsic dimension is well estimated and there is a bound on the residual variance due to embedding. In
other words, we need results for the following two and we are done.
1. Preprocessing Stage: We need an bound on correlated dimension of the sample points in the private
setting.
2. Algorithmic Stage: We need to bound the error on the residual variance in the private setting.
Once we have the two results, the algorithm for manifold learning follows using the standard methods
of Isomap [59]. For the correctness of the algorithm, refer to Hegde et al. [38] and the original work on
Isomap [59]. Here we just bound the correlated dimension and the residual variance. For the former, we use
the algorithm of Grassberger and Procaccia [31]. For the latter, we analyze the effect of perturbing the input
points so as to guarantee privacy.
Remark 1. Before we proceed with the proofs, a remark is due here. Note that we need to compute ΦX
until the residual error is more than some threshold of tolerance. If we simply use Gaussian random matrices
this would require O(rn2) time per iteration, an order comparable to the run-time of Isomap [59]. On other
hand, using our Φ, we need O(rn log r) time per iteration. This leads to a considerable improvement in the
run-time of the learning algorithm. 2
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Input: A set of sampled point Y = {y1, · · · ,ym} in Rn.
Initialization: r := 1. Construct xi ∈ R2n by setting xi =
(
σminei yi
)T for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Construct the matrix X with columns {x1, · · · ,xm}.
while residual variance ≥ ζ do
• Sample Φ from a distribution over r × 2n random matrices defined in Figure 1
• Run the Grassberger-Procaccia’s algorithm on ΦX.
• Use the estimate k̂ to perform Isomap on ΦX.
• Calculate the residual variance.
• Increment r.
Invoke the Isomap algorithm [59] with the intrinsic dimension k̂, points x1, · · · ,xm as sample
points, and an r × n matrix picked as per Figure 1.
Figure 2: Differentially Private Manifold Learning
Since the proof of Hegde et al. [38] for the preprocessing step does not need the specifics of the sampled
point, but only use the properties of Φ in preserving the pairwise Euclidean distance, the first bound follows
as in Hegde et al. [38].
Theorem 20. LetM be a compact k-dimensional manifold in Rn having volume V and condition number
κ. Let {x1, · · · ,xm} be a finite data points of the underlying dimension k. Let k̂ be the dimension estimate
of the algorithm of Grassberger and Procaccia [31] over the range (dmin, dmax). Let η = − log(dmin/dmax).
Suppose dmax ≤ κ/2. Fix a 0 < η < 1 and 0 < δ < 1. Let Φ be a random projection that satisfies Theo-
rem 1 such that
r ≥ O
(
k log(nVκ) log(1/δ)
η2ζ2
)
.
Let k̂Φ be the estimated correlation dimension on ΦX over the range (dmin
√
r/n, dmax
√
r/n). Then with
probability at least 1− δ,
(1− η)k̂ ≤ k̂Φ ≤ (1 + η)k̂.
For the second part, we need to take care of two types of perturbation: the input perturbation to convert
the original sampled points to points in R2n and the distortion due to embedding in a lower dimensional
subspace. For this, we need to analyze the effect of the input perturbation. We prove the following result.
Theorem 21. LetM be a compact k-dimensional manifold in Rn having volume V and condition number
κ. Let {x1, · · · ,xm} be the points formed by finite data points of the underlying dimension k as in Figure 2.
Let d be the diameter of the datasets where the distance metric used to compute the diameter is the geodesic
distance. Let Φ be a random projection that satisfies Theorem 1 such that
r ≥ O
(
k log(nVκ) log(1/δ)
ε2
)
.
Let R and RΦ be the residual variance obtained when Isomap generates a k-dimensional embedding of X
and ΦX, respectively. Then we can construct a graph such that with probability at least 1− δ,
RΦ ≤ R+O
cεd2 + cε( ln(4/β)√16r log(2/β)
α
)2 .
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In concise, the above theorem shows that we incur an additive error of cε
(
ln(4/β)
√
16r log(2/β)
α
)2
in the
residual variance due to the privacy requirement.
Proof. The proof proceeds by using an appropriate graph that uses the randomly projected sampled points
as the vertices and then computes the bound on the overall residual variance incurred due to the errors
in estimating the geodesic distances. The graph G that we use is similar in spirit to the construction of
Bernstein et al. [11]. Such graphs has the sampled points as its vertices.
For a graph G, we define a term graph distance between two vertices. For two vertices u,v in the graph
G, we denote the graph distance by ‖u− v‖G. The graph distance between two points u,v is defined as
‖u− v‖G := min
P
{‖u− xi1‖2 + · · ·+ ‖xipv‖2} ,
where the minimum is over all paths P in the graph G between u and v and the path P has vertices
u,xi1 , · · · ,xip ,v. Using Theorem A of [11], we have for some constant ϑ, we have
(1− ϑ)‖u− v‖Geo ≤ ‖u− v‖G ≤ (1 + ϑ)‖u− v‖Geo.
Let x˜1 = Φx1, · · · , x˜m = Φxm be the points corresponding to the embedding. Let us denote the
corresponding graph whose vertices are the set {x˜1, · · · , x˜m} by ΦG. The edges of the graph is defined in
a way so as to satisfy the requirements of Theorem A of [11] and suit our purpose as well. As in the case
of the graph G, we define the distance on the new graph ΦG formed by the vertices corresponding to the
embedded points.
‖w − z‖ΦG := min
P
{‖w − x˜i1‖2 + · · ·+ ‖x˜ipz‖2} .
In order to fully describe the graph ΦG, we need to define the edges present in the graph. We connect
two nodes in ΦG be an edge if ‖w − z‖2 ≤ (1 + η)ε. It is important to note that we define the edges
depending on the Euclidean distance.
Now we use this construct of graph ΦG to define another graph G′ whose vertices are the original
sampled point. The graph G′ has an edge between two vertices only if there is an edge between the vertices
corresponding to their embeddings, i.e., u and v are connected inG′ if and only if ‖Φu−Φv‖2 ≤ (1+η)ε.
By our construction, G′ also meets the requirements for Theorem A of [11]. We can now finish the first part
of the proof.
Let P ′ be a path in G′ joining two vertices u and v. Then by our construction, there is a path P in ΦG
along the vertices corresponding to the embedding of the vertices along the path P ′ in the graph G′. Let the
path P ′ consist of vertices u,xi1 , · · · ,xip ,v. Then
‖u˜− x˜i1‖2 + · · ·+ ‖x˜ip − v˜‖2 = ‖Φu−Φxi1‖2 + · · ·+ ‖Φxip −Φv‖2
≤ (1 + η) (‖u− xi1‖2 + · · ·+ ‖xip − v‖2) .
This holds for every path, and similar lower bound holds for every path. It therefore, follows that
(1− η)‖u− v‖G′ ≤ ‖u− v‖ΦG ≤ (1 + η)‖u− v‖G′ .
Using the result of [11], we have the following.
(1− η)(1− ϑ)‖u− v‖Geo ≤ ‖u− v‖ΦG ≤ (1 + η)(1 + ϑ)‖u− v‖Geo.
Adjusting η and ϑ, we have the required bound on the geodesic distances. Therefore, the graph distances
of ΦG (which can be computed purely from the embedded points) provide a fairly good approximation of
the geodesic distance on the manifold.
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For the second part, let B be the matrix formed with entries (a, b) representing the squared geodesic
distances between xa and xb. Let I be the corresponding matrix computed by the Isomap algorithm. From
the analysis of Isomap, we know that the entries (a, b) is
Iab = −
B2ab − 1m
∑
a B
2
ab − 1m
∑
b B
2
ab +
1
m2
∑
a,b B
2
ab
2
.
Further, I = JTJ, where J is a k × m matrix. In the Isomap algorithm, the final step computes the
k-dimensional representation of every point by performing the eigenvalue decomposition of I by projecting
column vectors of X onto the subspace spanned by eigenvectors corresponding to the k largest eigenvalues.
The residual variance is defined as the sum of the m − k eigenvalues of I. In the ideal situation, when I is
rank k matrix, the residual variance is zero. However, we have some error due to projection and perturbation
of the sampled points. From Theorem 19, we know that x has a distortion of ε or 3ε in the case of squared
norm. Moreover, any column x of X is formed by distorting y of the sampled point, which is by an additive
term of σ2min. Therefore, every term in I suffers a distortion of at most 6ε(d
2 + σ2min), where d is the square
root of the largest entry of B (or the diameter of the sampled points). Therefore the matrix I varies as
I(ε) = I + 6ε(d2 + σ2min)
as a function of the distortion ε. This implies that the eigenvalues can be represented by the following
equation:
λi(ε) = λi + 6ε(d
2 + σ2min)v
T
i Evi,
where {vi}mi=1 are the eigenvectors and E is a matrix with entries ±1. Hence the residual variance as a
function of ε can be written as :
RΦ = R(ε) =
∑
λi(ε)
=
(
m∑
i=k+1
λi
)
+ 6ε(d2 + σ2min)
(
n∑
i=k+1
vTi Evi
)
= R+ 6ε(d2 + σ2min)
(
n∑
i=k+1
vTi Evi
)
≤ R+ 6ε(d2 + σ2min)(m− k)Λ
< R+ 6mε(d2 + σ2min)Λ,
where Λ is the largest eigenvalue of E. Therefore, the average embedding distortion per sample point under
the effect of random embedding and input perturbation (to preserve privacy) varies by at most 6ε(d2 +
σ2min)Λ. Note that Λ is bounded by a constant as E is a bounded linear operator. This gives us the result of
the theorem.
The proof is now complete.
4.2 Differentially private streaming algorithm
Upadhyay [61] gave a method to convert a non-private streaming algorithm to a differentially private al-
gorithm so that the resulting algorithm requires almost optimal space. However, the update time of their
algorithm is slow by a linear factor in comparison to the non-private algorithms. Using Theorem 16 and
combining with the results of Upadhyay [61], we improve the update time of differentially private streaming
algorithms to be the same as the non-private algorithms.
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Theorem 22. Given A ∈ Rm×n,b ∈ Rn. There is a privacy preserving data-structure that can be updated
in time O(m +
√
m/ε log(1/δ)) and requires O(m2ε−1 log(1/δ) log(mn)) bits to solve linear regression
of A with respect to b in the turnstile model with (α, β+ δ)-differential privacy. The additive error incurred
is 4σminα‖A†b‖2F .
Similar improvement for differentially private matrix multiplication of Upadhyay [61] is straightforward.
We give the description of these private algorithms in the full version.
Formally, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 23. Let A be an m1 × n matrix and B be an m2 × n matrix. There is a privacy preserving data-
structure to compute matrix multiplication ABT in the turnstile model that guarantees (α, β)-differential
privacy. The underlying data-structure used by the algorithm requires O(mε−2 log(1/δ) log(mn)) bits and
can be updated in time O(m log(ε−2 log(1/δ))), where m = max {m1,m2}. The additive error incurred is
σminα
√
N‖B‖F .
Theorem 24. If the singular values of anm×n input matrix A are at least 16r log(2/β) ln(4/β)α(1+ε) , then publishing
ΦTΦAT, where Φ is as in Figure 1 preserves (α, β + δ)-differential privacy.
The proof of the above theorem is fairly straightforward by invoking the second main result of Upad-
hyay [61] which is as follows.
Theorem 25. (Upadhyay [61]). Let R be a random matrix such that every entry of R is sampled indepen-
dently and identically fromN (0, 1). If the singular values of an input matrix C are at least 16r log(2/β) ln(4/β)α ,
then publishing RTRCT is (α, β)-differentially private.
Proof. Substitute C = BAT and R = P1, where A is as in Theorem 24, B is as in Lemma 14, and P1 be
as in Section 3.
This leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 26. Let λ1 ≥ · · · ≥ λrk(A) be the singular values of A. Then for an over-sampling parameter p,
there is a single-pass mechanism that compute the k-rank approximation A¯ usingO(k(n+d)α−1 log(nm))
bits while preserving (α, β + δ)-differential privacy such that
(i) ‖A− A¯‖F ≤
(
1 +
k
p− 1
)1/2
min
rk(A′)<k
‖A−A′‖F + 2k
α(1 + ε)
√
(n+ d) ln(k/β)
p
, and
(ii) ‖A− A¯‖2 ≤
(
1 +
k
p− 1
)1/2
λk+1 +
e
√
(k + p)
∑
j>k λ
2
j
p
+
2
√
k(n+ d) ln(k/β)
α(1 + ε)
.
Proof. The privacy proof follows by plugging in Theorem 24 in the privacy proof of [61]. The utility proof
follows in the same way as in [61].
5 Other Applications
5.1 Compressed Sensing
Our bound in Theorem 6 directly translates to give a random matrix with optimal RIP for r ≤ n1/2−τ .
Baranuik et al. [9] showed the following:
Theorem 27. Let Φ be a r×n random matrix drawn according to any distribution that satisfies equation (1).
Then, for any set T with |T | = s < n and any 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, we have ∀x ∈ XT
PrΦ[(1− δ)‖x‖2 ≤ ‖ΦTx‖2 ≤ (1 + δ)‖x}2] ≥ 1− 2(12/ε)ke−O(δn),
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where XT is all x ∈ X restricted to indices in the set T . Moreover, the RIP holds for Φ with the prescribed
δ for any s ≤ O (δ2r/log(n/r)) with probability at least 1− 2e−O(r).
Baranuik et al [9] argued that their bound is optimal. To quote, “From the validity of theorem (Theo-
rem 27) for the range of s ≤ cr/ log(n/r), one can easily deduce its validity for k ≤ c′r/([log(n/r) + 1])
for c′ > 0 depending only on c.” Combining Theorem 27 with Theorem 10, we have,
Theorem 28. For any set T with |T | ≤ s ≤ O
(
r
log(n/r)
)
, there exists a mapping Φ such that, for all
x ∈ X with non-zero entries at indices in the set T , we have Pr [(1− δ)‖x‖2 ≤ ‖Φx‖2 ≤ (1 + δ)‖x‖2] ≥
1−2(12/δ)ke−O(δn). Moreover, Φ can be sampled using 2n+n log n random bits and Φx can be computed
in time O(n log b). Here b = min{c2a log
(
r
δ
)
, r} with a = c1ε−1 log
(
1
δ
)
log2
(
r
δ
)
.
5.2 Functional Analysis
Charikar and Sahai [17] showed an impossibility result for dimension reduction using linear mapping in
`1 norm. Johnson and Naor [41] gave an elegant result which generalizes Charikar and Sahai’s result.
Concisely, they showed that a normed space which satisfies the JL lemma is very close to being Euclidean
in the sense that all its n-dimensional subspaces are isomorphic to Hilbert space with distortion 22
O(log∗ n)
.
More formally, they showed the following.
Theorem 29. LetX be a Banach space such that for every n and every x1, · · · ,xm ∈ X , there exists a linear
subspace F ∈ X of dimension at mostO(ε−2 log n) and a linear mapping fromX to F such that equation (1)
is satisfied. Then for every ` ∈ N and every `-dimensional subspace E ⊆ X , we have the Banach-Mazur
distance between E and Hilbert space at most 22O(log∗ `) .
Our main result directly improves this characterization in the sense that we only need almost linear
random samples. However, there are another subtle applications of our result in Functional analysis. For
this, we need the result by Krahmer and Ward [45, Proposition 3.2].
Theorem 30. (Krahmer-Ward [45, Proposition 3.2]) Let ε be an arbitrary constant. Let Φ be a matrix of
order k and dimension r×n that satisfies the relation k ≤ c1δ2kr/ log(n/r). Then the matrix ΦD, where D
is an n× n diagonal matrix formed by Rademacher sequence, satisfies equation (1).
Recently, Allen-Zhu, Gelashvili, and Razenshteyn [6] showed that there does not exists a projection
matrix with RIP of optimal order for any `p norm other than p = 2. Using the characterization by Johnson
and Naor, our result gives an alternate reasoning for the impossibility result of [6]. Moreover, Pisier [52]
proved that if a Banach space satisfies the condition that Banach-Mazur distance is o(log n), then the Banach
space is super-reflexive. Because of the uniform convexity properties of the norm over these spaces [30],
super-reflexive Banach spaces are of centre importance in Functional analysis (see for example the excellent
book by Conway [21]). Theorem 6 and Theorem 29 gives one such space using only almost linear random
samples!
5.3 Numerical Linear Algebra
Our bound gives the same results as obtained by Kane and Nelson [43] for matrix multiplication, which
is optimal as long as m ≤ 2
√
n. For the case of linear regression, we achieve the same bound as long
as m ≤ √n. This is because of a subtle reason. The approximation bound for linear regression uses an
observation made by Sarlos [55], who observed that the approximation guarantee for linear regression is
provided as long as Φ provides good approximation to matrix multiplication as long as Φ is an O(m)-
space embedding. The latter follows from the standard result on any Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform
with r = O(rank(A) + log(1/δ)/ε2). Using the result of Indyk and Motwani [39], we only need r =
O(m2ε−1 log(1/δ)). In concise, we need to project to a subspace with dimension r = O(m/ε). Using our
distribution over random matrices, this is possible only if m ≤ O(√n/ε).
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6 Impossibility of Differential Privacy Using Other Known Constructions
Blocki et al. [12] asked the question whether known distribution of matrices with JLP preserves differential
privacy or not. In this section, we answer their question in negation by giving simple counter-examples.
Our counter-example works by showing two neighbouring matrices with the properties that they differ by at
most one column of unit norm. Each of our counter-examples are constructed with care so as to allow the
attack.
Theorem 31. Let Φ be a random matrix picked from a distribution defined by Nelson et al. [51], Kane
and Nelson [43], Dasgupta et al. [22], or Ailon and Liberty [3]. Then the distribution ΦA and ΦA′ are
distinguishable with probability 1/ poly(n), where A and A′ are two neighbouring matrices.
We prove the above theorem by giving counter-examples designed specifically for each of the above
constructions.
6.1 Random Linear Combination Based Construction of Nelson, Price, and Wooters [51]
We give verbatim the description of the Nelson et al. [51] of their construction of RIP matrices. The
construction for matrices with JLP follows straightforwardly from the result of Krahmer and Ward [45].
Let DM be a distribution on M × n matrices, defined for all M , and fix parameters r and B.
Define the injective function h : [B] × [r] → [rB] as h(b, i) = B(b − 1) + i to partition [rB]
into r buckets of size B, so h(b, i) denotes the i-th element in bucket b. We draw a matrix
Φ′ ∼ DrB , and then construct our r × n matrix Φ by using h to hash the rows of Φ′ into r
buckets of sizeB. Define a distribution on r×nmatrices by constructing a matrix Φ as follows:
1. Draw Φ′ ∼ DrB , and let Φ′i: denote the i-th row of Φ′.
2. For each (b, i) ∈ [m]× [B], chose a sign σb,i ∼ Rad(1/2).
3. For 1 ≤ b ≤ r, let
Φb: :=
∑
i∈[B]
σb,iΦ
′
h(b,i)
and let Φ be the matrix with rows Φb:.
First note that with probability 2−(B+1), σ1,i = 1 and σ2,i = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ B. In other words,
Φ1: =
∑
i∈[B] Φ
′
h(1,i) and Φ2: =
∑
i∈[B] Φ
′
h(2,i). In the counter-example for both the construction by
Nelson et al. [51], we concentrate on the the top-most left-most 2 × 2 sub-matrix of Φ. We denote this
sub-matrix by Φ22 for brevity. Recall that B = poly log n in both the constructions of Nelson et al. [51].
Construction Based on Bounded Orthonormal Matrices. Recall that the two neighbouring matrices
used in our counterexample in the introduction is as follows.
A =

w 1 0 · · · 0
0 w 0 · · · 0
0 0 w · · · 0
...
...
. . .
0 0 0 · · · w
 and A˜ =

w 1 0 · · · 0
1 w 0 · · · 0
0 0 w · · · 0
...
...
. . .
0 0 0 · · · w

for w ≥ σmin. They are neighbouring because the two matrices differ only in the first column and their
difference have a unit norm, ‖A− A˜‖2 = 1. We consider the 2× 2 sub-matrices of A and A˜ to show that
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this construction does not preserve differential privacy. The two sub-matrices have the following form:(
w 1
0 w
)
and
(
w 1
1 w
)
. (14)
Now considering Φ22, the possible (non-normalized) entries are as follows:(
1 1
1 −1
)
,
(
1 1
1 1
)
,
(
1 −1
1 −1
)
,
(
1 1
1 0
)
,
(
1 0
1 1
)
.
Now, with probability 2−B−3 = 1/poly(n), the corresponding 2× 2 sub-matrix formed by multiplying
ΦDA are (
w w + 1
w 1− w
)
,
(
w w + 1
w w + 1
)
,
(
w 1− w
w 1− w
)
,
(
w w
w 1
)
,
(
w 1
w w + 1
)
.
On the other hand, the corresponding 2× 2 sub-matrix formed by multiplying ΦDA˜ are(
w + 1 w + 1
w − 1 1− w
)
,
(
w + 1 w + 1
w + 1 w + 1
)
,
(
w − 1 1− w
w − 1 1− w
)
,
(
w + 1 w + 1
w 1
)
,
(
w w + 1
w + 1 w + 1
)
.
Note that in each of the cases, an adversary can distinguish the two output distribution. For example, in
the first case, the entries in the second row for A˜ is negation of each other while it is not so in the case of A.
Similarly, in the second case, all entries are the same in A˜ while different in A.
Note that publishing ΦAT when w ≥ σmin preserves privacy when Φ is a random Gaussian matrix.
Hash and Partial Circulant Matrices Based Construction. Let v =
(
1/
√
2 1/
√
2 0 · · · 0)T. In
this case, we use the following set of neighbouring matrices:
A = wFTn and A
′ = wFTn + ve
T
2 (15)
for w ≥ σmin. They are neighbouring because ‖A − A˜‖2 = 1 and they differ in only one column. As in
the previous two cases, we concentrate on the 2 × 2 sub-matrices, which would be enough to argue that
an adversary can distinguish the output distribution corresponding to these two neighbouring matrices. The
partial circulant matrix can be represented as P = FT1..rDiag(Fng)Fn, where F
T
1..r is the restriction of F
T
n
to the first r-rows and Diag(Fng) is the diagonal matrix with diagonal entries formed by the vector Fng.
Let y = Fng, then the 2 × 2 sub-matrix formed by the application of Diag(y)FnDA and Diag(y)FnDA˜
yields, (
wy1 0
0 wy2
)
and
(
wy1
√
2y1
0 wy2,
)
(16)
respectively. The rest of the computation is similar to the case of bounded-orthonormal matrices after
observing that the two sub-matrices have the form quiet similar to equation (14) and that the rest of the steps
are the same as in the bounded-orthonormal case. An alternative could be the following line. We multiply
the published matrix with F1..r. In other words, we need to concern ourselves with Diag(Fng)FnDA and
Diag(Fng)FnDA˜. Thus equation (16) suffices to distinguish.
Note that publishing ΦAT when w ≥ σmin preserves privacy when Φ is a random Gaussian matrix.
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6.2 Hashing Based Construction
There are two main constructions that were based on hashing co-ordinates of the input vectors to a range
{1, · · · , S} [22, 43], where S is the sparsity constant. The main difference between the two construction
is that Dasgupta, Kumar, and Sarlos [22] hash co-ordinates with replacement while Kane and Nelson [43]
hash them without replacement. More details on their construction and the counterexample follows.
6.2.1 Construction of Dasgupta, Kumar, and Sarlos [22]
We first recall the construction of Dasgupta et al. [22]. Let a = c1ε−1 log(1/δ) log2(r/δ), b = min{c2a log(a/δ), n}.
Let D = {d1, · · · , dab} be a set of i.i.d. random variables such that for each j ∈ [ab], dj ∼ Rad(1/2). Let
δα,β denote the Kronecker delta function. Let h : [b] → [r] be a hash function chosen uniformly at ran-
dom. The entries of matrix H ∈ {0,±1}r×b is defined as Hij = δi,h(i)dj . Then their random matrix is
Φ := HWD.
In order to analyze this construction, we need to understand the working of the random matrix H. The
main observation here is that the matrix H has column sparsity 1, i.e., every column has exactly one entry
which is ±1 and rest of the entries are zero. Let j be the row for which the first column is non-zero and k
be the row for which the second column is non-zero.
Our neighbouring data-sets are exactly like in equation (15) except that we use Hadamard matrix instead
of the discrete Fourier transform.
A = wWT and A˜ = wWT + veT2 (17)
for w ≥ σmin. They are neighbouring because ‖A− A˜‖2 = 1 and they differ in only one column. Now just
as before, with probability 1/4, the first 2× 2 sub matrix formed by WDA and WDA′ is as below(
w 0
0 w
)
and
(
w
√
2
0 w
)
,
respectively. Now consider the sub-matrix formed by the j-th and k-th row and the first and second columns
of the output matrices corresponding to A and A˜. Just like before, simple calculation shows that in each of
the possible cases, the two distribution is easily distinguishable. This breaches the privacy.
Note that publishing ΦAT when w ≥ σmin preserves privacy when Φ is a random Gaussian matrix.
Remark 2. A remark is due here. Note that the above attack works because we know explicitly what would
be the output of the hash function h. If the hash function outputs a value picked i.i.d. from a Gaussian
distribution, we could not argue as above. Moreover, since the Gaussian distribution is subgaussian, the
analysis of Kane and Nelson [43] would still hold and the resulting distribution of random matrices with
samples picked from Rad(1/2) replaced by a Gaussian variable would also satisfy the JLP. 2
6.2.2 Construction of Kane and Nelson [43]
The first two constructions of Kane and Nelson [43] differs from that of Dasgupta, Kumar, and Sarlos [22] in
the way they pick which co-ordinates of the input vector should be multiplied with the Rademacher variable.
Both of them employ hash functions to perform this step. In Kane and Nelson [43], hashing is done without
replacement, whereas, in Dasgupta, Kumar, and Sarlos [22], hashing is done with replacement. Since our
counterexample does not depend whether or not the hashing is done with replacement, the counterexample
we exhibited in the case of the construction of Dasgupta, Kumar, and Sarlos [22] is also a counter-example
for the construction of Kane and Nelson [43].
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6.3 Construction of Ailon and Liberty [3]
The construction of Ailon and Liberty [3] has the following form Φ = BWD, where B is a random dual
BCH code and D is a diagonal matrix as in all the other constructions. This can be equivalent to saying that
Φ has the following form:
Φ =
√
1
r
HWD(1)WD(2)W · · ·WD(`),
where D(i) are independent diagonal matrices with non-zero entries picked i.i.d. from Rad(1/2) and H is a
subsampled (and rescaled) Hadamard-transform. They proved that this construction satisfies the JLP for the
regime cν−2s log n ≤ r ≤ n1/2−τ with ` =
⌊
− log(2√n/r)/ log k⌋ for k < 1/2 and for cν−2s log n ≤
r ≤ n1/3/ log2/3 n with ` = 3. In what follows, we show a simple attack when ` = 3. The case for arbitrary
` =
⌊
− log(2√n/r)/ log k⌋ follows similar ideas and is omitted. Note that because of the choice of `, this
leads to an at most polynomial degradation of our analysis.
As before, we give two neighbouring data-sets as in equation (17).
A = w(WT)3 and A˜ = w(WT)3 + veT2 (18)
for w ≥ σmin. They are neighbouring because ‖A − A˜‖2 = 1 and they differ in only one column. The
probability that these two rows are picked is 2r/n. Since the probability that each of the D(j) has the first
two non-zero entries 1 is 1/8. Therefore, the same conclusion as before holds with probability r/4n.
Note that publishing ΦAT when w ≥ σmin preserves privacy when Φ is a random Gaussian matrix.
7 Analysis of Previously Known Distributions with JLP
We conclude this paper by analysing and revisiting some of the older known constructions. A simpler proof
of few of the known constructions have been shown by Kane and Nelson in two successive works [42, 43].
In this section, we give altnerate analysis of few known distribution over random matrices satisfying JLP.
Few of these results have been shown by Kane and Nelson in two successive works [42, 43]. At the centre of
our proofs is Theorem 4. To be self-contained, we give a simple proof of Theorem 4 with Gaussian random
variables in Appendix C.
Random Matrix Based Construction. The first construction proposed by Johnson and Lindenstrauss [40]
uses a random Gaussian matrix as the projection matrix Φ, i.e., each entry Φij ∼ N (0, 1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤
j ≤ n. Noting that the result of Theorem 4 does not involve the dimension of the matrix A and subgaussian
random vectors, the proof follows simply from Lemma 9 and Theorem 4 by substituting every zi = x to be
the same unit vector x.
Kane and Nelson [42] showed that the distribution of Achlioptas [1] can be shown to satisfy JLP using
the Hanson-Wright’s inequality. We just restated their result. This construction has every entries of Φ picked
i.i.d. from Rad(1/2). Since this distribution is also subgaussian, the proof follows by invoking Theorem 4
with a vector whose entries are picked i.i.d. from Rad(1/2).
The second construction of Achlioptas [1] is aimed to reduce the number of non-zero entries. It is
defined by the following distribution:
Φij :=

+
√
3 with probability 1/6
0 with probability 2/3
−√3 with probability 1/6
(19)
It is easy to check from the moment-generating function that the above distribution is also sub-gaussian.
The proof thus follows as above.
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Bounded Moment Construction. Arriaga and Vempala [7] showed that any bounded random variables
satisfies the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform. The proof using Hanson-Wright now follows from the fol-
lowing lemma which states that random variables with bounded random variables are sub-gaussian.
Lemma 32. Suppose X is a symmetric random variable which is bounded. Then X is subgaussian.
Proof. Suppose X is a bounded random variable with a symmmetric distribution. That is, |X| ≤ M for
some constant M and −X has the same distribution as X . Then
Pr[exp(tX)] = 1 +
∑
k≥1
tkPr[Xk]
k!
.
By symmetry, Pr[Xk] = 0 for each odd k. For even k, Pr[Xk] ≤Mk , leaving
Pr[exp(tX)] = 1 +
∑
k≥1
t2kPr[X2k]
(2k)!
≤ exp(M2t2/2).
because (2k)! ≥ 2kk! for each k. This completes the proof because this is one of the properties of subgaus-
sian distribution.
Fast Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform and variants. The projection matrix used by Ailon and Chazelle [2]
is Φ = PWD, where W is the Hadamard matrix, D is a diagonal matrix with non-zero entries picked i.i.d.
from Rad(1/2), and the matrix P is constructed in the following manner: every entry Pij is picked from
normal distributionN (0, 1) with probability p and set to 0 with probability 1− p. The parameter p governs
the number of non-zero entries in P. They set p = Θ(n−1 log2(1/δ)).
We look at this construction in an alternate way, which was used by Upadhyay [60]. The matrix P can
be seen as formed by the composition of two matrices: an (r × t) matrix P1 and a (t× n) matrix P2 in the
following way. P1 is a random Gaussian matrix with entries picked i.i.d. from N (0, 1) and P2 randomly
samples co-ordinates from
√
n/t(WDx) with replacement. From Lemma 9, we know that P1 preserves
isometry upto a multiplicative factor of (1 ± ε). We prove the same about P2. For that we use Theorem 7
which states that ‖WDx‖∞ ≤
√
log(n/δ)/n for x ∈ Sn−1.
Let y be the vector formed by sampling due to P2 sampling co-ordinates of
√
n/t(WDx) with replace-
ment. Therefore, ‖y‖22 =
∑t
i=1 y
2
i . Also, E[‖y‖2] = 1. Hoeffding’s bound gives the following
Pr
[|‖y‖22 − 1| > ε] ≤ exp(−ε2t/ log(n/δ)). (20)
For this to be less than δ, pick t = ε−2 log(1/δ) log(n/δ). This was the value chosen by Ailon and
Chazelle [2] as well.
The construction of Ailon and Liberty [3] can also be shown to satisfy JLP once we notice that sub-
sampling WD results in a matrix which has 2 blog(1/δ)c-wise independent entries. We can therefore
invoke Theorem 4 as it is true when the random variables picked from a sub-gaussian distribution are
2 blog(1/δ)c-wise independent. This was known as folklore, and, to our knowledge, shown first by Kane
and Nelson [43]. For the construction of Matousek [46], we make the following remark.
Remark 3. We remark that since signed Bernoulli random variable is sub-gaussian, we can replace P by the
following matrix: with probability p, sample from Rad(1/2); otherwise, set it to 0. This was exactly the
construction of Matousek [46]. 2
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Sparse Johnson-Lindenstrauss Transform. Kane and Nelson [42] have shown the proof of the sparse-JL
construction of Dasgupta et al. [22] using the Hanson-Wright inequality. Kane and Nelson [43] gave a code-
based construction which they proved preserves Euclidean norm (see Section 3 of their paper). They also
used Theorem 4 invoked with Rad(1/2). We do not know if their main construction with optimal sparsity
constant can be simplified using Theorem 4. To our knowledge, these three are the only known constructions
of sparse-Johnson Lindenstrauss transform.
8 Discussion and Open Problems
In this paper, we explored the properties of a distribution of random matrices constructed using linear random
samples. We gave a distribution of random matrices that satisfies JLP as long as r = O(n1/2−τ ). The reason
for this bound comes from Lemma 8. This is the single source of slackness and could lead to a belief that
any improvement in this lemma would result in overall improvement of the bound. We now show that we
cannot improve on it with the present construction. The issue that we face was also faced by Ailon and
Liberty [3]. We follow up with more details.
Let x ∈ Sn−1 which has 1/n1/4 on the first √n coordinates and is 0 everywhere else. With probability
2−
√
n, D does nothing to x (i.e. Dx = x). Then Wx is just some other vector with equal mass spread on√
n coordinates, and so does when we apply Π. So with probability at least 2−
√
n, P is just being applied
to some permutation of x. In the best case scenario none of the coordinates of x land in the same block,
in which case ‖Px‖22 = (1/t)
∑t
i=1 g
2
i for independent gaussians gi, where t =
√
n. For the expression
(1/t)
∑t
i=1 g
2
i to be an isometry with probability 1− δ, we need t ≈ ε−2 log(1/δ). But t =
√
n leading to
a contraction. Therefore, we cannot have any guarantee when δ ≈ 2−
√
n.
This paper leads to many open problems. We conclude the paper by listing few open questions.
1. The first open problem is to give a distribution that uses linear random samples, allows fast matrix-
vector multiplication, and allows embedding for all possible values of r. As shown in the above
counterexample, the main source of slackness is in proving Lemma 8. If we can somehow improve
this bound by some other technique which does not require lot of random bits, it would lead to an
improvement of the overall bound. One technique that is often useful in such scenario is decoupling
where under limited dependence, we prove results equivalent to that of completely independence of
random variables. The excellent book by De la Pena and Gine [24] shows many such examples. It
would be interesting if any such methods can be applied in our context.
2. An open problem, also suggested by Blocki et al. [12], is to get a better error bound by, maybe, using
error correcting codes. To quote them,
Can we introduce some error-correction scheme to the problem without increasing r sig-
nificantly? Error amplification without increasing r will allow us to keep the additive error
fairly small. One can view the laplacian of a graph as a coding of answers to all 2n cut-
queries which is guaranteed to have at least a constant fraction of the code correct, in the
sense that we get an approximation to the true cut-query answer.
3. At present, our understanding of low dimension embedding for any normed space other than `2-norm
is very restricted. For example, even modest question like whether one can embed any m-point subset
of L1 into a subpace of L1 with dimension cn for c < 1/2 with O(1) distortion is unclear. There are
some positive works in this area, most notably by Schechtman [56], but since then, there has been no
significant progress in this area. One area of future research is to better understand the low-dimension
embedding in other normed spaces.
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A Reducing the Running time to O(n log r)
To reduce the running time, we use the main result of [2] of which Theorem 7 is a corollary. They proved
that if Wb is a randomized Hadamard matrix of order b, then for any z ∈ Sb−1,
Pr [‖Wbz‖∞ ≥ ρ] ≤ 2b exp(−ρ2b/2). (21)
We use the same idea as used by Ailon and Liberty [3], which is to replace W by a block matrix with n/b
blocks of Hadamard matrix Wb for b = rc for an arbitrary constant c > 1:
W′ :=

Wb 0
b · · · 0b
0b Wb · · · 0b
...
. . . . . .
...
0b 0b · · · Wb

The proof is similar to that of Ailon and Liberty [3] with further strengthening by Dasgupta, Kumar, and
Sarlos [22]. Let D be a diagonal matrix as before. Then the random matrix W′D is a orthogonal matrix.
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We form G by normalizing it. We need to study the behaviour of Gx for a unit vector x ∈ Sn−1. Divide x
into t = n/b equal blocks x(1), · · · ,x(t). First of all notice that Theorem 7 holds trivially when ‖y‖2 ≤ 1.
Let G(i) be the i-th block of G. Then we can write y(i) = G(i)x(i). Moreover, if for a block i, if ‖x(i)‖2 ≤√
(log(n/δ))/n, then ‖y(i)‖∞ ≤
√
(log(n/δ))/n. Since x ∈ Sn−1, there can be at most n/ log(n/δ)
different blocks which have ‖x(i)‖2 ≥
√
(log(n/δ))/n. Plugging this in equation (21), using the fact that
rc−1/ log(n/δ) ≤ rc−1/ log(r/δ) ≤ 1, and applying union bound gives us the required bound.
B Differentially Private Streaming Algorithms of Upadhyay [61]
In this section, we present the streaming algorithms of Upadhyay [61] for the sake of completion.
B.1 Matrix Multiplication
Suppose we want to compute matrix multiplication when matrices A and B are streamed online. The
algorithm of Upadhyay [61] to compute the matrix multiplication is described below. The main idea is to
lift the spectra of the input matrices above the threshold of Theorem 16.
INITIALIZATION. For multiplication approximation parameter ε with confidence δ, privacy parameters
α, β, set r = O(log(1/δ)/ε2). Set w =
√
16r ln( 2β )/α ln(
16r
β ). Set the intial sketches of A and
B to be all zero matrices YA0 and YB0 .
DATA-STRUCTURE UPDATE. Set m = max{m1,m2}. On input a column a of an n ×m1 matrix A and
column b of an n×m2 matrix B at time epoch t, set the column vector Â:a =
(
wea 0
n+m A:a
)
and B̂:b =
(
web 0
n+m B:b
)
. Compute ΦÂ:a and ΦB̂:b, where Φ is sampled as per the distribution
defined in Figure 1. Update the sketches by replacing the columns a of YAt−1 and b of YBt−1 by the
respective returned sketches to get the sketch YAt ,YBt .
ANSWERING MATRIX PRODUCT. On request to compute the product at time t, compute YTAtYBt .
B.2 Linear Regression
Suppose we want to compute linear regression when the matrix A is streamed online. The algorithm of
Upadhyay [61] to compute linear regression is presented below. The main idea is to lift the singular values
of the input matrix above the threshold of Theorem 16.
INITIALIZATION. For multiplication approximation parameter ε and additive approximation parameter δ,
privacy parameters α, β, set r = O(m log(1/δ)/ε), w =
√
16r ln(2/β)α−1 ln(16r/β), and YA0 to
be all zero matrix.
DATA-STRUCTURE UPDATE. On input a column c of an n ×m matrix A at time epoch t, set the column
vector Â:c =
(
wec 0
n+d A:c
)
. Compute ΦÂ:c, where Φ is sampled as per the distribution defined
in Figure 1. Update the sketch of A by replacing the column c of YAt−1 by the returned sketch to get
the sketch YAt .
ANSWERING QUERIES. On being queried with a vector bi, set the column vector b̂i =
(
ei 0
n+d bi
)
.
Compute Φb̂i to get the sketch Ybi , where Φ is sampled as per the distribution defined in Figure 1.
Compute a vector xi satisfying minx ‖YAtxi − Ybi‖.
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C Proof of Theorem 4 with Gaussian Random Vectors
Let y ∼ N (0, 1)n. Set S = |yTBy−Tr(B)| for a symmetric matrix A. Then using the Markov’s inequality,
we have the following.
Pr[S > η] = Pr[exp(tS) < exp(tη)] ≤ E[exp(tS)]
exp(tη)
. (22)
We need to evaluate E[exp(tS)]. Since B is a symmetric matrix, we can consider its eigen-value decom-
position, i.e., a matrix C = UBUT and w = Uy for an orthonormal matrix U such that C is a diagonal
matrix. Here we use the spherical symmetry of the difference of Gaussian distribution. We can then write∑
i,j
Bij(yiyj − E[yiyj ]) = yTBy − Tr(B) = wTCw − Tr(C) =
∑
ci(w
2
i − 1). (23)
To compute the expectation of this variable, we need to compute E[exp(d2i (w2i − 1))]; the final expec-
tation comes form the linearity of expectation. For that, we first need to estimate the PDF of the difference
of i.d.d. Laplacian random variables. The following lemma was proven by Hanson [33, Lemma 3].
Lemma 33. Let X be any sub-exponential random variable. Then for 0 < t ≤ τ for τ , there is a universal
constant c such that E[exp(t(X − 1))] ≤ exp(ct2).
We now return to the proof of Theorem 4. It is well known that if X is a subgaussian random variable,
then X2 is sub-exponential random variables. Therefore, we can use Lemma 33. Recall that we wish to
bound equation (22). We would have been done had we not assumed that |t| ≤ τ in Lemma 33. Therefore,
we have to work a little more to achieve the final bound. Plugging in the estimate of Lemma 33, we can
bound equation (22) as follows:
exp(−ηt) exp
(
ct2
∑
c2i
)
for t‖d‖∞ ≤ τ. Therefore, we have
Pr[S > η] ≤ exp (−ηt+ ct2‖C‖2F ) .
Simple calculus shows that the right hand side is a concave up function and achieves minimum when
t = η/(2c‖B‖2F ) if that is a permissible value for t. Now if we set t′ := min
{
η/(2c‖B‖2F , τ/‖B‖
}
. Then
we have
exp
(−ηt+ ct2‖B‖2F ) ≤ exp(−t′(η − ct′‖C‖2F )) ≤ exp(t′η/2).
Setting constants c1 = τ/2 and c2 = 1/4c, we get the claim
Pr[|yTBy − Tr(B)| ≥ η] ≤ exp
(
−min
{
c1η
‖B‖ ,
c2η
2
‖B‖2F
})
.
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